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Abstract
This paper introduces a model of sweet talk in which a seller may acquire veriable infor-
mation and selectively disclose it to a buyer to negotiate a deal. We start by analyzing a model
with common priors in which the seller generates information for two reasons: a trading motive
and a prot motive that is, to make trade possible or to increase the gains from it. There
exists a negotiation region in which the seller continues to reveal information even if trading is
already protable. We extend the model, allowing for di¤erent prior beliefs about the value of
the object, arguing that a complementarity between the sellers condence and the precision of
his information endogenously arises. Appointing an optimistic salesman may be costly because
he may destroy protable trading opportunities. We also allow the seller to choose in which
market to trade: a matching market with a xed price or a haggling market. Our model also
provides a testable di¤erence between a model of trading with homogenous priors and one with
heterogeneous priors and nds application in understanding contracts as reference points.
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1 Introduction
Negotiation is a very, very delicate art. Sometimes you have to be tough, sometimes
you have to be as sweet as pie." D. Trump
Stock issuers disclose nancial statements about their earnings forecasts, and investment banks
certify the value of a debt issued to investors; in general, salesmen emphasize the qualities of their
product to persuade consumers to buy it. In many contexts, then, buyers rely on seller-supplied
information. Rational buyers are aware that the information provided may be manipulated and
especially selectively disclosed; in fact, regulators constantly monitor the information released by
informed agents. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, requires
public companies to disclose meaningful nancial and other information to the public to provide
a common pool of knowledge for all investors because "only through the steady ow of timely,
comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound investment decisions." However,
the disclosure of information is crucial in many other industries, such as the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Recently, many policy proposals have tried to change the testing and reporting requirements
requested by the Food and Drug Administration for the approval of drugs. In all of these cases,
after the release of new information, parties update their expectations about the objects value and
begin to negotiate to reach an agreement on the terms of the contract between them. An issuer
may have to lower the price of its initial public o¤ering if negative news about the rms future
earnings become available. A pharmaceutical company may be forced to withdraw its product from
the market, if new research certies this product has some unexpected side e¤ects.
This paper provides a novel model of negotiations through persuasion, in which the seller acquires
veriable information and strategically discloses it in order to persuade the buyer of the intrinsic
value of the object, which in turn a¤ects the trading price. It di¤ers from the common models of
bargaining used in the literature1 for two main reasons. First, bargaining between a seller and a
buyer usually takes place after the buyer has already decided to buy the object. Second, in models
of bargaining, the buyer and the seller have valuations determined ex ante about the object, and
the bargaining procedure only determines how the parties will split the surplus through the price.
1A review of the relevant literature is presented in the next section.
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The model presented here builds instead on the theory of persuasion games, games in which a
seller provides veriable information to buyers to inuence the actions they take, i.e., buying the
object or not, but they do not explain how prices are settled2 . Information can be veriable
either because buyers can directly check its accuracy or because there are institutions in place that
e¤ectively deter misleading reports by sellers. However, this theory does not explain why, in reality,
we encounter many cases in which negotiations with the exchange of relevant information take
place, how the information may be used to strengthen each party position and, most importantly,
how this information may endogenously determine prices.
A growing literature has analyzed the transmission of strategic information between an informed
party and an uninformed agent, who usually has to choose an action based upon the information
revealed by the informed agent. Since Crawford and Sobel (1982), many authors have focused their
attention on what is called cheap talk, that is, a kind of information transmission that lacks a direct
linkage with the playerspayo¤s. This paper introduces instead what we called sweet talk; that is,
we allow a party to acquire veriable information and to use it to persuade an uninformed agent
to take a specic action. Examples of this kind of situation are very common in reality: a seller
may show to the buyer the salient characteristics of the product, trying to hide its drawbacks with
respect to the competitors. A stock issuer may truthfully disclose its nancial statements, but may
omit to reveal other important information.
I start analyzing a model with common priors, in which the seller generates information for two
di¤erent reasons. First, if the prior about the objects value is low, the seller discloses information
in order to persuade the buyer that the object is worth buying; that is, she has a trading motive to
acquire information. Second, even if the buyers belief about the object makes trade possible, the
seller may acquire information to increase the price at which she sells the good; that is, she has a
prot motive. We assume that the seller strategically discloses information to the buyer when she
is able to acquire it. The signal is non-falsiable: she cannot lie, but she can decide to withhold
the evidence. Once the buyer observes the signal, she can decide to trade or to wait for more
information.
Based on this model, I address the following questions:
(1) What is the sellers optimal disclosure strategy?
2This is the reason why, to avoid any confusion with bargaining models, I will use the terms negotiations, haggling,
sweet talk and persuasion interchangeably.
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(2) Under what conditions does the seller prefer to negotiate rather than trade as soon as it
becomes protable?
(3) Is overcondence a valuable asset in the market? That is, is it better to have an optimistic
salesman, who has a higher incentive to produce information to persuade the buyer or a
salesman with a prior belief about the quality of the good closer to the buyers?
(4) Under what conditions does the seller decide to sell the good at a xed price, without allowing
for information acquisition?
(5) What are the implications in terms of optimal contracts?
I show that there exists a unique threshold equilibrium in which trading occurs only if the signal
is above a cuto¤. However, the seller may disclose his information even when the signal she gets
is not accurate enough to convince the buyer to trade; that is, she will disclose it if she believes
that it is at least high enough to induce the buyer to continue the negotiation. Moreover, on the
equilibrium path the seller always tries to acquire information about the good.
I extend the model by allowing the buyer and the seller to have di¤erent prior beliefs about
the value of the object. Even the simplest model highlights the importance of negotiation and
information transmission to reach an agreement. I show that there exists a negotiation region
in which the seller provides information to the buyer to increase the objects value in his eyes.
Characterizing the equilibrium with heterogeneous priors gives us the ability to analyze the role of
overcondence. An overcondent seller truly believes that the information she is going to acquire
will turn out to show that the product has higher value than what the buyer thinks, and as a
result, she engages in too much haggling. That is, a seller with beliefs closer to those held by the
buyer tends to trade as soon as she is able to show that the joint surplus from trading is positive,
while for an overcondent seller, the prot motive leads him to waste possible protable trading
opportunities.
I then turn to a more general setting, in which I allow the seller to choose in which market to
sell the object, a matching market, in which she o¤ers the object at a xed price to a randomly
matched buyer, or in a "haggling market," where she might persuade the buyer. I argue that in
equilibrium, only very condent sellers are willing to haggle with the buyers. The trade-o¤ is clear;
while posting a xed price without the possibility of sweet talk avoids any pointless negotiation, it
may also eliminate some trading opportunities.
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The framework and the results presented so far have a variety of applications; I present one.
Following the recent analysis by Hart and Moore (2008) and Hart (2009), in which they show that in
many cases the buyer has to face an additional "shading" cost to ensure a consummate performance
by the seller, I provide an alternative based upon "persuasion costs." I identify a trade-o¤ between a
exible contract and a rigid one, due to the fact that only according to the rst one may negotiation
take place ex post. It is a trade o¤ similar to those studied by the cited papers but does not employ
any behavioral assumption. Moreover, in the case in which the partiesbeliefs are far from each
other, we argue that the exibility or the incompleteness of the contract should be reduced.
Finally, the model also provides a testable di¤erence between a model of trading with homoge-
nous prior beliefs and one with heterogeneous priors. In fact, while the bargaining stage of the
game ends up yielding the same outcome, the di¤erence relies in the information acquisition stage.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II is devoted to presenting the directions in which
we depart from the existing literature. Section III introduces the base model and discusses the
main assumptions. Section IV characterizes the equilibrium in the case with heterogeneous priors
analyzing the value of being overcondent and identies the optimal sellers decision between posting
a xed price in a matching market and participating in an haggling market. Section V applies the
model to two recent strands of the literature, while Section VI concludes and illustrates avenues for
future research.
2 Related Literature
This paper spans and borrows from several literatures. We examine the connections to each of
them.
Persuasion games. Since Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), an inuential strand of the
literature has analyzed settings in which an informed party can manage the disclosure of informa-
tion, which cannot be misrepresented but only hidden. Subsequent papers, such as Milgrom and
Roberts (1986), Farrell (1986), Lipman and Seppi (1995) and Shin (1994), have provided cases in
which the receiver is able to discount fully the reports of the senders so as to completely reveal
that partys type. This is the so-called unraveling argument, or skeptical equilibrium, as dened
by Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Shin (1994) generalizes the previous models, showing that even
when the sender is not perfectly informed about the state, she will follow a "sanitization strategy,"
in which the good states are revealed while the bad realization of the signals is suppressed. More
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recently, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) have characterized the mechanism that minimizes the
probability of a mistake by the decision maker. That is, they study a mechanism that maximizes
the probability that the listener accepts the senders request when it is justied and rejects the
request when it is unjustied, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is
accepted. Milgrom (2008) observes that Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) characterize the equilibrium
where the buyers decision is binary and highlights that "There is, as yet, no extension of that
model that endogenizes prices." One of the methodological contributions of the paper is precisely
to study price determination in a persuasion game. This paper shares with Shin (2003) the interest
on the e¤ects of information on prices; in fact, Shin (2003) provides an interesting treatment of how
the selective reporting of information of the sort considered here a¤ects security price dynamics.
Milgrom (2008) is an excellent review of the works on persuasion games, and it highlights the main
di¤erence between cheap talk and persuasion, namely, the possibility for the seller to reveal informa-
tion selectively without lying. Our model departs from these models in that the buyers do not have
a binary choice, i.e., to buy or not to buy, but the price at which trade occurs is inuenced by sweet
talk. Notice also that the buyers skeptical strategy, which is central in the literature supporting an
unraveling argument, has little traction here. In our model, the buyer correctly believes that the
seller selectively discloses his information, but she does not have any new information with positive
probability. This means that in the literature there exists only a trading motive and not a prot
motive for disclosing information. Finally, our model is also related to Caillaud and Tirole (2007)
for their analysis on building consensus; they adopt a mechanism design approach to explore the
strategies that a sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a group to approve the proposal.
Finally, the biggest departure from the persuasion game literature comes from the observation that
the negotiation between a seller and a buyer is usually not only about the possibility of trading but
on which price to trade.
Bargaining. Shavell (1994) consider a seller-buyer relationship where each party may acquire
information about the value of the good; however, this information does not always have social value;
that is, it does not increase value. In contrast, I suppose that the seller acquires information about
the goods value and that both parties revise their valuations based on the information disclosed.
In our setting, we also identify the conditions under which haggling with the buyer can result in a
more e¢ cient trading relationship than does posting a price with no information communication.
The trade-o¤ between di¤erent selling mechanisms has already been analyzed by Wang (1993),
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Peters and Severinov (1997), Kultti (1999), among others, but we stress the persuasion costs as a
key element of this decision.
Heterogeneous priors. In Section IV, I drop the common prior assumption to analyze how
di¤erent types of sellers behave as a function of their priors and to determine whether overoptimistic
or impartial sellers have the greater incentive to acquire information. Recently, many papers have
questioned the use of the common prior approach, using a di¤erent framework (Morris 1994, 1997;
Yildiz 2003, 2004; Harris Raviv 1993; Hong and Stein 2007). This paper is also related to the strand
of the literature on belief formation, such as Benabou and Tirole (2006) or Benabou (2008). The
communication game presented here builds upon the model provided by Che and Kartik (2009).
They study a context in which a decision maker and an adviser have di¤erent prior beliefs over
the state of the world but where the adviser can acquire "hard" evidence. They show that the
decision maker chooses an adviser with at least some di¤erence of opinion, in order to motivate him
to acquire information. Our model departs from Che and Kartik (2009) since we introduce, for the
rst time, the possibility of trading in a persuasion game.
Organizational strand. I claim that this model may nd applications to common problems in
organizations, such as settings in which the agent may decide to adhere to the spirit, if not the letter
of the contract, i.e., consummate versus perfunctory performance. For example, in an organization,
the principal authority may make it prohibitively costly for the agent to completely renege on
the terms of the contract but may allow the agent to perform the assigned task in di¤erent ways.
Our model is then related to Hart and Moore (2008), which analyzes the optimal contracts when
the contract itself provides a reference point for a trading relationship, that is, a exible contract
can be very costly when the parties withhold some part of consummate performance if they feel
shortchanged. They say: "If the buyer prefers a and the seller b, the buyer may have to spend
time persuading the seller of the reasonableness of the choice a in order to ensure consummate
performance by the seller. These persuasion costs are a plausible alternative to the shading costs
we have focused on. Modeling persuasion costs is not easy, but it is an interesting topic for future
research." Our paper is the rst to provide a model for these persuasion costs, allowing me to
highlight the drawbacks associated with the sellers persuasion motive. There are cases, in fact in
which the seller, in a sense, is held up and is forced to provide much more information, bearing the
related cost, than what e¢ ciency requires.
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3 The Base Model
A buyer (he) and a seller (she) meet to trade a single, indivisible good. The goods value for the
seller is commonly known to be zero, while its value for the buyer is v 2 f 1;+1g : In the base
model, the two parties have a common prior about v; namely, Pr (v = 1) = q0:
There are two periods of negotiations, each involving information acquisition, disclosure, and
possibly trade. We analyze a two-period model; otherwise, if the surplus is positive, the parties will
be induced to trade at the end of period 1, lacking the ability to conduct any further negotiation.
In each period, the seller can rst exert unobservable e¤ort to acquire information about the value
of the good. If e¤ort is exerted, the seller obtains a veriable signal  2 f 1;+1g with probability
 2 (0; 1) : This signal agrees with the true value of the good with probability p 2 (1=2; 1) ; that
is, Pr ( = vjv) = p: Even though the signals value is veriable, its existence is not: the seller can
conceal the signal (report  = ;), and conversely, she cannot prove that she did not obtain a signal.
If the seller obtains a signal, she can decide whether or not to disclose it to the buyer. Following
this, the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price o¤er to the buyer. If the o¤er is accepted by the
buyer, then the parties trade and the game is over. The buyers ex-post payo¤ is v   x, while the
sellers is x; where x is the price o¤er accepted by the buyer.
If the o¤er is rejected in period 1, then play continues in period 2. In period 2, rejecting the
o¤er yields zero payo¤s to both parties. We assume that both parties are risk neutral and have
innitesimal discounting; that is, they prefer positive payo¤s earlier, but, for simplicity, we do not
formally introduce a discount factor. The timing is summarized in Figure 1.
In the base model we also assume that the cost of the sellers e¤ort to acquire information
is arbitrarily small and positive (i.e. innitesimal). As a result, the seller acquires information
whenever (in equilibrium) she is strictly better o¤ by doing so, and she does not acquire information
in the case that she is indi¤erent.
The other signicant simplication in the base model is that we assume that the seller makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in the bargaining phase of each period. Since the buyer has no private
information, this assumption implies that the buyer does not get any of the social surplus generated
by trade. We will argue at the end of this Section why this is a less stronger assumption than what
it appears.
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Seller gathers
information if
exerts effort,
learn σ or
nothing
Seller discloses σ,
or nothing, and
buyer updates his
valuation
If buyer accepts,
the parties trade,
or the seller may
acquire another
signal σ
Seller makes a take-it-
or-leave-it-offer to the
buyer
Seller discloses σ
or nothing, then the
buyer updates and
trade occurs if the
surplus is positive
Figure 1: : Timeline
3.1 Analysis of the Base Model
We solve the game backwards.
3.1.1 Continuation equilibrium in the persuasion phase
Assume that we enter the last period so that the buyer believes that the goods value is v = 1
with probability q2: We show that there is a unique continuation equilibrium given q2 at t = 2
irrespective of the values of all the other endogenous variables.
Denote d2 the sellers belief (probability assessment) at the beginning of period 2 that by exerting
e¤ort she gets a positive signal. For example, if the seller and the buyer have symmetric information
about the goods value at the beginning of period 2, then d2 =  (pq2 + (1  p) (1  q2)) : However,
note that the seller may have private information about the true value of v at the beginning of
period 2.
If the seller exerts e¤ort and gets a positive signal, then she reveals it, as this is the last period
and a positive signal can only help selling the good at a higher price. By an analogous argument,
if the seller gets a negative signal, then she conceals it. If she gets no signal (either because she did
not exert any e¤ort or because she did but did not get anything), then there is nothing to disclose.
Irrespective of the sellers expected behavior in period 2, if she discloses a positive signal at
t = 2, then the buyers updated belief regarding v = 1 becomes q+2 = q
+ (q2) ; where
q+ (q) =
pq
pq + (1  p) (1  q) (1)
If the seller is expected to exert e¤ort, then the buyers belief upon not being shown a signal is
q;2 = q
; (q2) ; where
q; (q) =
q (1  ) + q (1  p)
(1  ) +  [(1  q) p+ q (1  p)]
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If the seller is not expected to exert e¤ort and no signal is disclosed, then the buyers belief that
v = 1 is q;2 = q2 After the information acquisition and disclosure phase, at the end of period 2, the
seller o¤ers the good at the price max

2q+2   1; 0
	
in the case that she disclosed a positive signal,
and at max

2q;2   1; 0
	
in case that she did not. Note that the price she can get in the case of no
disclosure depends on whether or not she is expected to exert e¤ort in period 2 (that is, it depends
on the continuation equilibrium). In what follows, we write max fA; 0g = (A)+ :
In period 2, given a continuation equilibrium (that is, given whether or not the seller is expected
to exert e¤ort), the seller exerts e¤ort if, and only if,
2q;2   1

+
< d2
 
2q+2   1

+
+ (1  d2)

2q;2   1

+
that is, if and only if 
2q;2   1

+
<
 
2q+2   1

+
(2)
Proposition 1 For every q2 2 (0; 1) ; there exists a unique continuation equilibrium in period 2,
such that:
If q2  1  p, then the seller does not exert e¤ort in period 2; there is no disclosure, there is no
protable trade, and the sellers prot (social surplus) is zero.
If q2 > 1   p, then the seller exerts e¤ort in period 2. If she obtains a positive signal, then
she discloses it, and trade takes place at a price 2q+2   1 > 0; which also equals the expected social
surplus and the sellers prot. If she obtains a negative signal or no signal at all, then there is no
disclosure; protable trade takes place at price 2q;2   1 provided that it is positive.
Protable trade occurs in period 2 as q2 ! 1; or p! 1; or both.
Note that the sellers expected prot at the beginning of period 2 is positive and equals
d2
 
2q+2   1

+
+ (1  d2)
 
2q;2   1

+
if, and only if, q2 > 1   p: Otherwise the sellers expected
prot is zero.
Proof. Recall that the seller prefers to exert e¤ort in period 2 if and only if condition (2) holds.
Suppose that in equilibrium the seller is not expected to exert e¤ort in period 2. Then condition (2)
becomes
 
2q;2   1

+
<
 
2q+2 (q2)  1

+
as q;2 = q2 and q
+
2 = q
+
2 (q2) ; which must fail to hold in a
no-e¤ort continuation equilibrium. Since q < q+ (q) for all q 2 (0; 1) ; condition (2) fails if and only
if q+ (q2)  1=2: By equation (1), this is equivalent to q2  1  p: There is no protable trade and
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no surplus, as 2q+2   1 < 0 by p > 1=2: This proves the existence of an equilibrium with no e¤ort
and no protable trade if, and only if, q2  1 p: Suppose that in equilibrium the seller is expected
to exert e¤ort in period 2. In such an equilibrium condition (2) must hold with q;2 = q
; (q2) and
q+2 = q
+ (q2) : Since q; (q) < q < q+ (q2) for all q 2 (0; 1) ; condition (2) holds if, and only if,
q+2 (q2) > 1=2: By equation (1), this is equivalent to q2 > 1   p: Therefore, an equilibrium with
e¤ort in period 2 exists if, and only if, q2 > 1  p: This completes the proof of the Proposition.
When the seller possesses very precise information, she tends to be more willing in providing
information because the buyer knows she is more reliable. This leads to an upward revision, which
may induce parties to trade.
3.2 Equilibrium play in period 1
We look for an equilibrium in period 1 knowing that there is a unique continuation equilibrium (as
a function of the buyers beliefs) in period 2, as described in Proposition 1.
The rst useful result is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in the game where the seller does not exert e¤ort at t = 1 but
where a trade occurs either at t = 1 or t = 2 at a positive price with positive probability.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
The previous lemma is very intuitive: if the seller is so pessimistic in the rst place such that
she does not gather information then surely there will not be any trade at period 2, when the buyer
has already negatively updated his information because  = ;: Moreover, if the seller is condent
enough to exert e¤ort, it is optimal to do it at t = 1; with no delay. We now dene a region of
parameters in which we have no trade and no provision of e¤ort.
Proposition 2 Dene q such that q+
 
q

= 1   p: If q1  q; then the unique equilibrium involves
no e¤ort and no protable trade in either period.
Proof. First note that there is no equilibrium in which the seller only exerts e¤ort in period 2
as that would imply there is a protable sale in period 2 with positive probability contradicting
Lemma 1. Hence, if there is an equilibrium with no e¤ort in period 1 (implying no e¤ort and no
trade in either period), then q+ (q1)  1  p: Conversely, if q+ (q1)  1  p; then it is not worth it
for the seller to exert e¤ort in period 1, because even if she obtains and discloses a positive signal,
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she cannot make a protable trade right away (as 1  p < 1=2), nor can she get a positive payo¤ in
the continuation (as no e¤ort and no trade are expected with q2  q+ (q1)  1  p). The threshold
dened by q+
 
q

= 1  p is given by q  (1 p)2
p2+(1 p)2 :
Now we let q1 > q; then, in any equilibrium, the seller exerts e¤ort at t = 1:
Suppose that the seller gets a positive signal in period 1 and discloses it so that both parties
believe that v = 1 with probability q+ (q1) : The seller can either trade right away at the (fair) price
2q+ (q1)  1; or trigger a continuation by asking for a higher price. Clearly, if q+ (q1) 2 (1  p; 1=2];
then the seller cannot sell the good at a positive price in period 1, and so she prefers to negotiate
further (as negotiation yields a positive expected prot). Interestingly, even when there exists a
protable trading opportunity, i.e., q+ (q) > 1=2; the seller may decide to negotiate.
For all q+ (q1) = q1 > 1=2; dene the sellers payo¤-di¤erence between trading at t = 1 and
negotiating,
(q) = 2q   1 

d (q)
 
2q+   1
+
+ (1  d (q))

2q;   1

+

where d (q)   (pq + (1  p) (1  q)) is the expected probability that the seller obtains a positive
signal by exerting e¤ort in period 2. In deciding to negotiate, the seller trades o¤ a sure payo¤
now for an expected increase in payo¤ tomorrow. If the seller is very condent of getting a positive
signal, then negotiating may be the optimal strategy, even when trading at t = 1 would yield
positive payo¤.
Lemma 2 If  < 1 and q; (q) < 1=2; there exists a unique threshold q 2 (1=2; 1) such that the
seller who discloses a positive signal in period 1 prefers trading in period 1 rather than continuing
negotiation if and only if q+ (q1)  q:
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
The previous lemma has identied the sellers optimal decision rule between trading and nego-
tiating when she gets a positive signal. Intuitively, when it would be protable to trade even if
the seller does not disclose, then immediate trade is always better. If, instead, not disclosing could
trigger no trade from the buyer, the seller prefers to negotiate. There exists a trading region, a
negotiating region and a no-e¤ort one as depicted in Figure 2. The uniqueness of the equilibrium
follows from the fact that e¤ort is unobservable. That is, if the buyer expects the seller to exert
e¤ort, then it is optimal for the seller to do so. On the other hand, if the buyer does not expect
the seller to acquire any new information, the seller has a protable deviation strategy in acquiring
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         0 q q                                  1
No Trade-No Effort            Negotiation                       Trading
Figure 2: : Threshold Equilibrium
it, as he can always disclose it only if it is positive. This eliminates the other possible equilibria.
Next, we should investigate what happens when the seller gets a negative or no signal in period 1.
Suppose the seller exerts e¤ort, that is q1 > q, there are two cases. First, if she gets no signal, she
will try again in period 2, as trade was not protable in period 1, and then there will not be any trade
after the information acquisition attempt, either. Then, the analysis follows Proposition 1. Second,
if the seller gets a negative signal, she will not disclose it and will thus have private information
about the objects value. The seller downward revises the probability that by exerting e¤ort, she
gets a positive signal to d0 (qs)  E [2 = 1j1 =  1] ; which is d0 (qs) < d (q) : The expected prot is
now d0 (qs)
 
2q+2   1

+
+(1  d0 (qs))
 
2q;2   1

+
; where the prices at which she could sell the object
are computed using the buyers information (the buyer already takes into account the fact that the
seller may have gotten a negative signal when she does not disclose). Since d0 (qs) does not matter
in the decision of whether to acquire information, she will behave as in the symmetric information
case. The only di¤erence in the private information case is that the expected prot for the seller
might be negative, due to a re-weighting, which has decreased the expected prot. However, since
it is strictly increasing in qs; there will exist a threshold for the sellers belief bqs to start with, such
that getting a negative signal at t = 1 has not negatively impacted his decision of exerting e¤ort
at t = 2; i.e., d0 (qs)
 
2q+2   1

+
+ (1  d0 (qs))
 
2q;2   1

+
> 0; as long as qs > bqs: This means that
her expected prot will be positive if she does not discount too much the probability of getting a
positive signal in the period after observing a negative one in the past. The repeated feature of
the model and the possibility that the seller will withhold information, endogenously, generates a
di¤erence in priors at the beginning of period 2.
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The di¤erence between immediate trade and continuing in the persuasion phase (q; qs) is
strictly positive when q;2 > 1=2; while when q
;
2 < 1=2 we have that (q; q

s ) = 0 identies as before
a cuto¤, which is now function of the buyers valuation. Then, the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the seller exerts in the rst period, there exists a unique equilibrium of this
subgame in which:
If the seller gets a positive signal in period 1, there is immediate trade if and only if q+ (q1)  q;
otherwise, she engages in the negotiation.
If the seller gets no signal in period 1, she will exert e¤ort in period 2 if and only if q1 > 1  p:
If the seller gets a negative signal and qs < qs , there is no disclosure and no protable trade, and
the sellers prot is zero. If qs > q; instead, there is immediate trade if and only if q+ (q1)  qs;
otherwise she engages in the negotiation.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
Now the question is if the second threshold q will be reached and under what conditions this
will be the case. It depends on how informative the signals that the seller shows to the buyer are.
When his arguments are not so informative, i.e., when p is low, she is not able to shift the buyers
posterior until q; that is, she will not be able to sell his good at t = 1. However, if she produces
incontrovertible evidence, where p is close to 1; she will be able to convince the buyer immediately
and then sell the good without further negotiation. Notice that the two cuto¤s are endogenous and
that they are a function of the accuracy of the sellers information. When p is close to 1=2; that
is, his arguments are not convincing, we have q ! 1=2; that is she has a lower incentive to acquire
information in the rst place. On the other hand, when p is close to one, we have q ! 0; this means
that she will almost surely exert e¤ort but that it will be harder to reach the trading region as q is
closer to 13 : This suggests that when the sellers arguments are really informative she has a greater
incentive to negotiate due to the higher impact his information has on the buyers beliefs. Given
the previous discussion, note the following:
Remark 1 Negotiations happen only if p >> 1=2:
When the sellers arguments are uninformative, the buyer is not willing to listen, and trading is
thus determined only based upon the prior information about the object value, i.e., q  q.
3Precisely, the limit of q as p increases is 1
2  :
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To complete the equilibrium characterization, we need to analyze the sellers incentives to exert
e¤ort in the rst period as a function of the reliability of his information. That is, we compute the
expected gains from gathering information as a function of p:
3.2.1 Vague Evidence: p  12
In the analysis above we have supposed that the seller is willing to exert e¤ort in the rst period,
but this is true only if the prior is greater than a threshold qv0 which should be less than q where
the subscript stands for vague evidence. Given the results above, we know that if the seller ever
puts in e¤ort she will do that in the rst period; moreover, she will never decide to trade the good
in the current period without providing evidence, because she will not be able to reach the trade
region. We can dene his continuation payo¤:
s (q) =

d (q) (2q+   1)+ + (1  d (q))
 
2q;   1
+
if q+1
 
q0

> q
0 otherwise
The intuition is that qv0 must be such that if the seller gets a positive signal, she updates the
posterior until q; otherwise, his continuation payo¤ will be zero anyway. In fact, if in the second
period q < q; she will not exert any e¤ort, and this will lead to zero payo¤.
The following lemma formalizes this argument:
Lemma 3 The seller puts in e¤ort in the rst period only if q > qv0 2
 
0; q

:
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
Intuitively, if the seller has only vague arguments to convince the buyer then she has lower upside
value from acquiring information; however, if she wants to keep the buyer in the relationship, q > q;
she will exert e¤ort. This is one of the expressions of the trading motive.
3.2.2 Persuasive Arguments: p  1
In this case the seller has the opportunity to convince the buyer showing him just one piece of
evidence, because the buyer knows that her information is reliable. By Proposition 1, we have a
unique equilibrium and we can nd a new threshold for the prior as:
q+ (q
p
0) = q
The existence and uniqueness follows directly from the continuity of q+1 in q0 and from the uniqueness
of the "trading" threshold. We nd that qp0  (1 p)(1 (1 p))2p 2p2  > qv0 ; this means that if the common
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initial belief about the object is high enough, the seller may ends up trading it in the rst period,
while if the prior is low enough, she will haggle with the buyer in order to reach a positive price,
but she could also not succeed in persuading him.
Then, the equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4  The seller prefers to negotiate with the buyer rather than trade at the current
valuation if p is low. Then, she puts in e¤ort in the rst period only if q0 > qv0 ; while in the
second period she will acquire more information if q > 1  p: If she gets a positive signal she
will sell the good at price:
x2 =
(  
2q+2   1

+
if  = 1 
2q;2   1

+
if  2 f;; 1g
 The seller will instead prefer to trade at the current price if p is close enough to 1; and she
will exert e¤ort in the rst period if q0 > qp0 and she will trade in the second period at prices
x1
 
q1

:
Proof. Follows from the previous Lemmas and the discussion in the text.
3.3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some of the assumptions made above.
Small cost of acquiring or process information. Assuming that the seller may acquire information
at a positive but arbitrarily small cost allows us to sharply characterize the equilibrium in the second
period with a single cuto¤ strategy. At the same time, introducing a positive cost cs > 0 opens
the question of what is the e¢ cient amount of information that the seller should acquire. This
normative observation will drive some of the insights in the case of heterogeneous priors. Since for
the buyer, acquiring information is costless, he would induce the seller to gather as much information
as possible, as the buyer enjoys its option value without bearing its cost. However, a positive cost
c would make the analysis much more obscure. We introduce it when we discuss the benets of
having an overcondent seller.
We could also consider a positive cost cb for the buyers to process the information that is
revealed. This is the case, for example, when they have to verify the accuracy of the information
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transmitted or to check its congruence. Although the nature of the equilibrium will be preserved,
it would change the thresholds, which will now depend on that. If the information revealed is very
di¢ cult to process, represented by an increase in cb; then the buyer will be willing to listen to the
seller only if p and  are higher than before; otherwise, he will nd it optimal to walk away.
Finite horizon. We carried over our analysis in a three-period model with almost no loss of
generality. In fact, as it is true that the qualitative results will be robust to this kind of generaliza-
tion, after T periods of negotiations between the parties, the posterior could approximate 1, which
would induce the seller to no longer acquire information. Suppose that after T periods, the seller
has disclosed s times a positive signal about the value of the good. Therefore, we have
Pr
 
v = 1 j
TX
i=1
1 fi = 1g = s
!
=
 
T
s

(p)
s
(1  p)T s q 
T
s

(p)
s
(1  p)T s q +  Ts ( (1  p))s (1   (1  p))t s (1  q)
which approximates 1 as s!1: Even in this case, his optimal strategy would be to exert e¤ort
only for intermediate values of the posterior belief and then to trade when it is close enough to 1.
Bargaining. We have restricted our attention to a setting in which the seller makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er to the buyer. However, we could extend the model to a di¤erent bargaining procedure.
Consider the case in which the seller has disclosed his signals in both periods. Here, assuming a
common discount factor , sequential bargaining would lead the parties to split the surplus equally
with a price xi (q+) = (q
+
i   12 )+: However, since the seller may withhold his signal in the rst period,
she could in principle possesses private information if 1 =  1: In this case, the seller becomes more
impatient, as she believes that the next period she will receive with higher probability a negative
signal. She then has incentives to close the deal sooner, charging a lower price. In this scenario
the parties have di¤erent priors, at the beginning of period 2, about the object value, qs and qb:
Note that for the seller the value of having the object is zero and the buyers posterior is commonly
known between the parties. The bargaining stage of the game is thus not a¤ected. They split the
buyers surplus, if it is positive4 . The reason is that the di¤erence in priors, q; matters only in
the acquisition stage of the game, due to the sellers assessment of how likely it is to get a positive
signal. This has two implications. First, the equilibrium characterized in the previous section is
robust to di¤erent bargaining procedures. Second, this suggests a testable di¤erence between a
model with homogenous priors and one with heterogeneous ones: the information acquisition stage,
not the bargaining outcome.
4Note that this game is di¤erent from the bargaining game with di¤ering priors considered by Yildiz (2004),
because he assumes di¤erent priors on how likely each party will make an o¤er and not on the object value.
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Homogeneous priors. We have shown that even in a model with homogeneous priors the seller
and the buyer engage in a relationship with information transmission in order to generate surplus
to split at the bargaining stage of the game. The following section analyzes our framework in the
case in which the buyer and the seller have di¤erent priors about the object.
4 Persuasion with Heterogeneous Priors
We now extend the model to the case in which the seller and the buyer have di¤erent priors.
Although the equilibrium takes the same form, this section will allow us to study a number of
related issues.
4.1 The Model
We assume that the prior beliefs of each agent are common knowledge and Pr (v = 1) = q0i ; for
i = s; b: There is a signicant and growing literature that analyzes games with heterogeneous
priors. Spector (2000) and Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) do so in communication models with
exogenous information; examples in other contexts are Harrington (1993), Yildiz (2003), Van den
Steen (2005), and Eliaz and Spiegler (2006). Our model is di¤erent from the model of bargaining
with heterogeneous priors proposed, for example, by Yildiz (2004). Our model shows, in fact, that
the seller is only more impatient than the buyer depending on a sequence of signals about the value
of the good; that is, she is more impatient only when the buyer is more excited about the value of
the good.
Since the priors are commonly known, it is key to note that the bargaining stage of the game
is not changed, as already noted for the common prior setting. At the time of trading the seller
knows the buyers valuation of the good and then the seller can appropriate, as in the homogeneous
case, all of the surplus. We can assume that q0s > q
0
b ; that is, that the seller has a trading incentive
to start with to persuade the buyer.
Second period. Let us begin analyzing what happens in the second period. They will both have
two di¤erent posteriors about the value of the object q1s and q
1
b coming from the previous period
even if they have observed the same signal. Moreover, if the seller did not disclose his negative
signal in the rst period, she has private information about the value of the object. At this stage,
the seller has to decide whether or not to exert e¤ort. The posteriors are commonly known only if
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she discloses his signal in the rst period, then if q1b < q
1
s there is no surplus to appropriate, in fact,
due to an adverse selection e¤ect the price o¤ered will never be accepted by the buyer. Hence, the
seller will certainly exert e¤ort due to the trading motive. Let us dene as before:
dts
 
qts

= 
 
pqts + (1  p)
 
1  qts

Interestingly, even with heterogeneous priors, the seller may decide to acquire more information in
the case in which q1b > q
1
s if the following condition holds: 
2q2;b   1

+
< d1s
 
q1s
  
2q2+b   1

+
+
 
1  d1s
 
q1s
  
2q2;b   1

+
: (3)
The intuition is that when q1s is big enough and his signal is accurate enough, high  , she truly
believes that she will end up getting a positive signal, increasing in this way her expected payo¤.
Consequently, there now is also a prot motive. There is no surplus from trading if the buyers
posterior is lower than one half; the trading price that matters is simply the buyers posterior.
However, the probabilities used by the seller to take the expected value of putting in e¤ort are his
own posteriors about the value of the good. In fact, in the second period, the sellers posterior may
di¤er from that of the buyer in the case where she decides not to disclose his negative signal. We
have that condition (3) denes a unique threshold as shown by the following lemma:
Lemma 4 The seller puts in e¤ort if and only if q1b > q
1
b:
Proof. Equation (3) gives us the following condition:
pq1b
pq1b + (1  p) (1  q1b)
>
1
2
which can be solved for q1b = (1  p) as in Lemma 1.
Intuitively, the previous lemma shows that the seller will be more willing to provide evidence to
convince the buyer of the value of the good as his signals informativeness increases.
First period. I can dene the sellers payo¤-di¤erence between trading at t = 1 and negotiating,
by
(q) = 2qb   1 

d (qs)
 
2q+b   1

+
+ (1  d (qs))

2q;b   1

+

(4)
where the only di¤erence from the homogeneous case is given by a di¤erent probability of getting
a positive signal, d (qs) ; which can be now a function of the sellers private information. In the
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case in which she discloses his signal in the rst period, we are back to the homogeneous priors
case, and we can dene the same threshold qs = qb 2 (1=2; 1) such that the seller who discloses a
positive signal in period 1 prefers trading in period 1 rather than continuing negotiation if and only
if q+ (q1)  qi for i = s; b: Let us suppose that the seller withheld his signal in period 1. In this
case, she possesses private information, and the condition (q) = 0 can be rewritten as:
d (qs) =
qb   q;b
q+b   q;b
(5)
which belongs to the unit interval, as q+b > qb > q
;
b : We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 There exists a unique threshold equilibrium in which:
(i) If the seller gets a positive signal in period 1, she discloses it and there is immediate trade if
and only if q+ (q1)  q; otherwise, she engages in the negotiation.
(ii) If the seller gets no signal in period 1, she will exert e¤ort in period 2 if and only if q2 > 1 p:
(iii) If the seller gets a negative signal, there is immediate trade if and only if q+ (q1)  qs;
otherwise she engages in the negotiation.
Proof. Points (i) and (ii) are equivalent to what happens in the homogeneous priors case. Condi-
tion (5) denes a unique threshold qs: It follows from the fact that d (qs) is a continuous and strictly
increasing function of qs. The right-hand side of (5) belongs to the unit interval as d (qs) :
Intuitively, condition (5) sorts the sellers according to their level of condence and their will-
ingness to negotiate with the buyer. Notice that the RHS is an increasing function of the buyers
posterior. Then, when the buyer is already enthusiastic about the value of the good the seller should
sell it without any further negotiation. In the case of heterogeneous beliefs, we are able to write the
sellers belief as a function of the buyers valuation. We can establish that more condent sellers
negotiate more and moreover that they will be less inclined to delay trading when they correctly
anticipate that not disclosing the signal may trigger a decline from the buyer, i.e., when q;b < 1=2;
fewer types of sellers will negotiate. The analysis of the rst period e¤ort choice is analogous to
the homogeneous priors case.
4.2 Is Overcondence Valuable?
Although the equilibrium structure is similar to the case of common priors, the heterogeneity in the
prior beliefs gives us a natural way to answer a related and relevant question: does an overcondent
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seller always perform better?5 Intuition tells us that a very condent salesman may play a key
role in the negotiations, as she will be more willing to acquire information, which will enhance his
ability to persuade the buyer. However, if the acquisition of information is costly, it may be optimal
to choose a less condent seller, especially, when this information is imprecise. This means that
there exists an interesting endogenous complementarity between competence and condence in this
model; a higher qs increases the expected prot when it is associated with higher p; i.e., the higher
accuracy of the sellers information.
To address this question, consider a slightly modied setting in which there is a positive cost for
acquiring information c > 0; which is not paid by the seller but by a principal who owns the good.
The owner has to appoint a salesman, using the sellers level of condence captured by his prior
qs
6 : To focus only on the interesting case in which there is a possible e¢ ciency loss in overinvesting
in persuasion, suppose that the parties have already negotiated, such that qb > qs > 1=2; and let
us compute the sellers type that maximizes the principal expected payo¤7 .
Dene the following cumulative distribution function:
 (qs)  Pr ( (qs) < t)
we can then denote the probability that qs belongs to the set A; where it is dened as A 
fqs :  (qs) > 0g ; by 1    (eqs) where eqs is the cuto¤ at which (qs) becomes positive. The
principal expected prots as a function of the sellers belief are given by
Maxqs = [1   (eqs)] qb +(eqs) [d (qs) q+b + (1  d (qs)) (2q;b   1)+   c]
we take expectation over the set A  fqs :  (qs) > 0g ; that is the set of beliefs such that the
seller is not willing to negotiate. The rst term is the expected prot in the case of a seller who
immediately trades with the buyer, as there is a positive surplus from trading. The second term is
the expected payo¤when the seller is condent enough to acquire new information and to persuade
the seller at cost c for the principal. To simplify notation and make the intuition clearer, let us
5For an excellent review on psychological literature on overcondence see Odean (1998) and references therein.
For empirical evidence on overcondence in nancial markets see Barber and Odean (2001), Glaser and Weber (2003),
and Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2003), among many others.
6To make the result sharper, I assume that there is no exogenous cost in appointing a more optimistic
salesman: Introducing, for example, a convex cost c (qs) ; with c0 > 0 and c0
0
> 0; would induce an interior so-
lution for every range of the parameters.
7We abstract from the salesmans optimal payo¤ function. This is equivalent to assuming that he gets paid a
xed share of the generated income. This is a very commonly used contract in the sales industry.
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dene   Pr  q;b > 1=2 which is independent of qs; and the density function of the sellers type
by  (qs) : The rst order condition is given by8

 
d (qs) q
+
b   qb

+(eqs)d0(q+b   q;b ) = c (eqs)   h(1  d (qs)) q;b   ci (6)
where on the left-hand side we have the benets of having a more condent seller and on the right-
hand side we have the associated costs. Equation (6) has an intuitive interpretation. The rst term
represents the increased charged price in the case in which the seller shows a positive signal to the
buyer. The second term is the benet deriving from a positive signal, which is conditional on having
chosen a condent seller, i.e., qs 2 A:On the right-hand side, we have the xed cost of engaging
in negotiation with the buyer and, more interestingly, the second term is the cost associated with
selling the good at a lower price q;b ; if no information is revealed, which can well be lower than the
initial buyers belief qb: The following proposition identies the condition under which we have an
interior qs :
Proposition 6 In the case of costless information, c = 0; equation (6) has a corner solution at
qs = 1: For intermediate values of the parameter, and when c is small enough, we can nd an
interior solution. Moreover:
 For given ; when p! 12 we might have an interior solution only if
qb <

2
q+b +

1  
2

q;b  (7)
 For given p; when ! 1 we have that  ! 0 then an interior solution, if any, solves
c( (qs) + ) = 
 
d (qs) q
+
b   qb

+(qs) d
0q+b
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
Before interpreting the condition used in the proposition, we can also state the following com-
parative statics result
Lemma 5 The prot function s (qs; p) has increasing di¤erences in qs and p; that is s (q0s; p) 
s (qs; p) with q0s > qs is non decreasing in p:
8We have dropped the dependence of d0 (qs) on qs because d (qs) is a linear function.
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Proof. Since the prot function is di¤erentiable, we can easily derive the rst-order condition (6)
with respect to p; and show that @
s
@qs@p
 0:
The supermodularity of the prot function ensures that the value of hiring a seller who is very
enthusiastic about the value of the good is increasing in his ability or expertise, in providing ac-
curate information. This result points out that a new dimension, the reliability of the information
disclosed, rather than the willingness to acquire it, may be key. The proposition also has an inter-
esting interpretation. First, picking a perfectly condent salesman is optimal only when acquiring
information has no cost, as in this case, the principal benets come from the option value of raising
the trading price. However, in reality there are many costs associated with gathering and transmit-
ting information, i.e., writing an informative prospectus, running quality tests and spending time
in presenting the results. Second, when the signal that the seller may get is not very informative,
indicated by a value for p close to one half, it is optimal to have a "buyer-minded" seller if condition
(7) fails to hold, i.e., there is a corner solution with qs equal to its lower bound. The condition
ensures that the price that the seller may charge without gathering any information is lower than
the expected price in the case of information provision. This is, for example, the case of those
salesmen who are able to negotiate better just through sweet talking without really conveying any
useful information to the buyers. Third, when the probability of receiving useful information about
the quality of the good is very high, the buyer heavily discounts the reservation price when he does
not receive any communication from the seller. In many contexts, the buyer is aware that a simple
investigation, such as testing the good, would reveal important information about its quality, and
this induces him to be suspicious about a seller who claims that the test is not feasible or that it
did not reveal anything.
An overcondent salesman will acquire information without internalizing the exogenous cost c
and, more importantly, will underestimate the probability of missing some protable opportunities.
4.3 Matching Market vs Negotiating
We now investigate whether the seller may do better allocating the price in a matching market,
without allowing for any persuasion.
Matching market. Suppose that potential buyers arrive according to a Poisson process9 . The
9We have explored other matching functions, which do not a¤ect the qualitative results. Even allowing for auctions
if more than one buyer shows up, only marginally increases the expected prots of a seller who enters in a matching
market, without changing the main insights. Details are available upon request.
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rate of arrival is ; thus, the probability of exactly k potential buyers arriving within an interval of
time of length t is given by
Pk (t) =
(t)
k
k!
e t k = 0; 1; 2:::
The value of the object for the potential buyer i is assumed to be drawn independently according
to the di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function F on the support
h
q
b
; qb
i
with probability
density function f (qb) > 0 and qb > 0: To post the price, the seller incurs a cost of displaying at
rate  until an arriving buyer agrees to pay the posted price. Since the expected length of time to
sell the object is 1= [1  F (p)] ; the price charged by the seller is then
p = argmax
p
s (p)  p  
 [1  F (p)]
assuming that the second order condition is satised, i.e., d
2s(p)
dp2  0; the expected prot for the
optimal p may be rewritten as
s (p) = p   1  F (p
)
f (p)
then it does not depend on the prior sellers belief qs:
Haggling market. The seller will decide to negotiate with the buyer depending on the pair
(qs; qb) : Let us now take qs as given so that we can analyze the optimal sellers strategy. The seller
will acquire information only if qb < bqb; where the cuto¤ is optimally determined and bqb  qs; as
shown in Proposition 5. The expected prot of the seller is given by
s (qs) =
Z qb
q
b
fIfqb>bqbgqb + Ifqb<bqbg[d (qs) (2q+b   1)+ + (1  d (qs)) (2q;b   1)+]gdF (z) (8)
where we can characterize the optimal threshold bqb with the following lemma.
Lemma 6 The persuasion cuto¤ bqb (qs) increases with the sellers prior belief qs:
Proof. The cuto¤ is dened as bqb (qs) = argmaxs (qs) : Then as ds(qs)dqs > 0; we can apply the
envelope theorem to prove that bqb (qs) is an increasing function of qs:
At this point, we can rewrite (8); employing the fact that Ifqb>bqbg = 1  F (bqb) : The seller will
prefer to post a xed price only if
s (p)  s (qs) > 0
or, more precisely,
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Proposition 7 There exists a belief qhs such that for every qs < q
h
s the seller posts a xed price;
otherwise, she tries to persuade the buyer. The range of parameters for which haggling is the best
option is increasing in p and :
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
The previous proposition provides a testable implication of our theory; the more condent the
seller is, the more likely it should be to observe him selling the good in bilateral trade rather
than in an anonymous random-matching market. The reason is that in the latter, it is di¢ cult to
persuade the buyer of the value of the good. This may be one of the reasons why goods whose
value cannot be objectively measured, such as antiques, fashion clothing and used cars, are rarely
sold through anonymous random-matching mechanisms, in contrast to, for example, books and
high-tech products usually sold online.
5 Application
In this section, we explore the role played by persuasion costs in explaining when writing a exible
contract may not be optimal.
5.1 Contracts and Persuasion Costs
A buyer and a seller meet at date 0 and can trade at date 1. We assume that there is symmetric
information throughout and that the parties are risk neutral and face no wealth constraints. I
consider the case where the buyer wants one unit of an indivisible good from the seller at date 1;
however, there is uncertainty about the buyers valuation vb and the sellers outside option vs; while
cost c is known at date 0. This uncertainty is resolved at date 1, but vb and vs are not veriable
and thus state-contingent contracts are not feasible. We interpret vi for i = S;B; as subjective
valuations about the good and normalize them to vi 2 [0; 1]. For example, a buyer may order the
good but only after the seller has provided it, he can nd out and appreciate its true characteristics,
and he may even be able to test it before buying it. In other words, the valuations are the subjective
probabilities that the good is worth 1, and its objective value is v 2 f 1; 1g. On the other hand,
the seller may have incurred some cost in producing it in addition to that expected at date 0,
or, more interestingly, she can believe herself to be able to sell the good to some other customer
if she breaches the contract. This interpretation of vi as subjective valuations makes the lack of
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state-contingent contracts less important for the result. Finally, we suppose that trade (q = 1) is
voluntary; that is, a party cannot be punished for breaching the contract.
Let us start observing that the rst-best trading rule is given by
q = 1, vb   vs  c:
We distinguish between a rigid contract and a exible agreement. A rigid contract consists of a
no-trade price p0 and a trade price p1: Given the voluntary trade assumption, trade will occur if
and only if vb   p1   p0 and p1   c  vs + p0; that is,
q = 1 , vb  p1   p0  vs + c:
Given the existence of transfers, we can normalize p0 to zero, as only the di¤erence between p1 and
p0 matters. It is immediately apparent that trade occurs less often than in the rst-best case.
A exible contract, instead, species a no-trade price p0 and an interval of trading prices

p; p

10 :
In this case,
q = 1 , 9 p  p1  p s.t. vb  p1   p0  vs + c; (9)
That is, trade occurs if and only if parties can nd a price in the specied range, such that both
parties are willing to trade. Condition (9) simplies to
q = 1 , vb   vs  c; vb  p; p  vs + c
as, in this case as well, only the di¤erence between the prices matters.
We now come to the assumption that represents a signicant departure from Hart and Moore
(2008) and from the relevant literature. We suppose that price is determined as the outcome of a
negotiation between the parties, in which each of them may acquire with probability  a signal ;
at cost ci () ; where i = S;B and c
0
> 0; c00 > 0; about the goods objective value v 2 f 1; 1g ;
where i = Pr ( = vjv) : That is, each party may acquire information and may also increase its
precision at an increasing cost. After this persuasion phase, the party who has gathered the new
evidence o¤ers a price. The assumption of costly information makes sure that in equilibrium only
the more condent of the parties, will try to persuade the counterparty. Assume also that
10More general contracts than those considered in the text are possible for example, a contract could allow both
p0 and p1 to vary. However, since the main motivation for this section is to provide an alternative to the model by
Hart and Moore (2008), we will focus on these two simple contracts, which are the main object of their analysis.
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d+(p+1   v+s ) +
 
1  d+ (p;1   v;s )  cs (s) (10)
and
d (v b   p 1 ) +
 
1  d  (v;b   p;1)  cb (b) (11)
where d+ is, as dened in the base model, the probability of receiving a positive signal, i.e., d+ =
(vs + (1  ) (1  vs)); and, analogously, d  is the probability of receiving a negative signal;
d  = ( (1  vb) + (1  ) vb) : The costs are computed at the optimal e¤ort choice i . Thus,
the conditions (10) and (11) ensure that in expectation it is worth it to attempt to persuade the
counterparty. It is important to remark that the expectation is taken according to each players
belief. Notice that, an overcondent seller will try to boost the buyers valuation up to the point
at which she will nd it optimal to sell him the good. On the other hand, a picky buyer may try
to show to the seller all of the goods drawbacks, simply to lower the selling price. We now analyze
two di¤erent cases.
Case 1. Suppose that at date 1, vs + c > vb: Because, the seller in this case believes that she
will be able to sell the good for a higher price to another buyer, if she does not persuade the buyer,
she will nd it optimal to breach the contract. Given condition (10), she acquires the signal and
discloses it only if it is positive. The buyer expects the seller to show him the signal; he will then
update his beliefs according to
v+b =
vb
vb + (1  ) (1  vb)
if the seller shows indeed some new evidence of the qualities of the good, while he will update
downward to
v;b =
vb (1  ) + vb (1  )
(1  ) +  [(1  vb)+ vb (1  )]
in the case of no disclosure. In this case, the seller may o¤er at most
p1 (s; p) =Min

d+v+b +
 
1  d+ v;b ; p :
The seller, then, has complete control over the price but has to stick within the contract; she cannot
exceed p: To complete the analysis, let us clarify the optimal persuasion strategy. The optimal e¤ort
level s solves the sellers rst-order condition di¤erentiated with respect to the precision of his
information
p01 (

s; p) = c
0
s (

s) :
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The seller increases the precision of his information, up to the point at which the expected increase
in the trading price is equal to the marginal cost of e¤ort.
Case 2. Suppose, instead, that at date 1, vb > vs + c: This may capture some colorful appli-
cations, such as the case of picky buyers who have already decided to trade but try to achieve the
best feasible deal. In this case, the buyer will o¤er a price
p1
 
b; p

=Max

d v s +
 
1  d  v;s ; p
and his precision b makes the expected reduction in price equal to its marginal cost. Observe,
however, that in this case we may have an additional ine¢ ciency. Here, the buyer may boost the
sellers valuation up to the point where v+s > vb; this induces him to breach the contract. Dene
by  the probability that the buyer destroys this trading opportunity, i.e.,   Pr  v;s > vb   c :
Thus, an optimal contract solves
Maxp;p V (vs; vb) =
Z 
vb   vs   c  Ifvs+c>vbgcs (s; p)
 Ifvs+c<vbgfcb
 
b ; p

+  (vb   vs   c)g

dF (vs; vb) ;(12)
s:t:
vb   vs  c (13)
vb  p;
vs + c  p
where F is the distribution of (vs; vb) : We derive an interesting trade-o¤: a large interval

p; p

makes it more likely that trade will occur if vb   vs  c; in fact, in the limit in which p !  1
and p!1; the trading rule becomes the rst-best one. However, it also increases the persuasion
costs. If p increases, the seller will exert more e¤ort in the persuasion phase of the relationship,
as the contract allows him to charge a higher price. On the other hand, if for example the buyer
asks the seller to be arbitrarily refunded for the time spent or makes her pay a penalty, if the buyer
believes that the good has a lower quality than expected, i.e., p < 0; he will try to demonstrate to
the seller the malfunction of the product, exerting more e¤ort.
Even in the presence of persuasion costs, we are able to achieve the rst-best with a simple
contract p = p; under some conditions.
Proposition 8 A simple contract achieves the rst best if (i) only vb varies;(ii) only vs varies;
or (iii) the smallest element of the support of vb is at least as great as the largest element of the
support of vs + c:
28
If only vb varies, choose a simple contract with p = c+vs: In case (ii) ; choose a contract p = vb:
If (iii) holds, choose a simple contract with p between the smallest vb and the largest c+ vs:
We now turn to the analysis of the e¤ects that the parameters have on the optimal contract.
Proposition 9 The optimal p (vs) is a decreasing function of the sellers valuation vs, while the
buyers valuation increases the optimal p (vb). Then, as the pair (vb; vs) increases, the optimal
contract becomes less exible.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
We have introduced persuasion costs as an alternative to shading costs, and it has given us not
only the ability to derive the same trade-o¤ between the exibility and the rigidity of a contract,
as in Hart and Moore (2008), without any behavioral assumption but has also allowed us to shed
new light on a novel issue. In the case in which the partiesbeliefs are far from one another, the
incompleteness or exibility of the contract should be reduced. In our environment, disagreement
has a high cost and induces the parties to persuade each other at a cost that is increasing in their
valuations. Disagreement also carries a cost in terms of losing trading opportunities.
Although we have restricted our attention to these two types of contracts, leaving the analysis
of the optimal contract in presence of persuasion costs as an open question, we believe that the
main qualitative result would hold.
When the parties may have a large disagreement in opinions, a rigid contract becomes a better
option, as it reduces any attempt to persuade the counterparty.
6 Conclusion
Probably the most important contribution of this paper is to provide a framework in which to ana-
lyze the costs related to negotiation through persuasion. This provides, in the spirit of Williamson
(1985), a new rationale for transaction costs. The introduction listed the main insights. Rather
than restating them, let us conclude with a couple of avenues for future research.
First, we focused on the transaction costs of negotiating deals, but it is certainly worth con-
sidering the nature of the relation between persuasion and ex post transaction costs. Each party
may incur some costs in order to induce the other party to perform according to the spirit of the
contract or to adapt to contingencies that are not describable ex ante.
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Second, as argued by Bernheim and Whinston (1998), the incompleteness of contracts may be a
deliberate choice of sophisticated parties. Understanding whether an agent may strategically decide
to leave the contract incomplete because he believes himself to be able to negotiate with the other
party a better deal ex post, acquiring and disclosing new information, would shed new light on the
role played by heterogeneous beliefs regarding the formation of the contract.
Third, the ability of the seller to persuade and inuence the buyers decision is a¤ected by past
negotiated deals. A seller may nd himself stuck in a trading relationship in which his perceived
informativeness does not allow him to a¤ect the buyers beliefs; that is, the trading relationship
may display path dependence. A seller may not want to regret having abused his ability to sweet
talk.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, suppose that no e¤ort is expected in period 1, and, after no disclosure,
protable trade is expected to take place at t = 1: This implies q1 > 1=2; otherwise the seller could
not sell the good at a positive price at t = 1: Consider the sellers deviation to exerting e¤ort and
disclosing a positive signal, if obtained. With positive probability the seller gets a positive signal.
Both partiesbeliefs are updated to q+ (q1) > q1: The seller can now o¤er a price slightly below
2q+ (q1) 1 but above 2q1 1: The o¤er is immediately accepted by the buyer; the goods expected
value exceeds the price, and the buyer knows that if he rejects the o¤er, in the continuation the
seller exerts e¤ort (as q2 = q+ (q1) > q1 > 1=2 > 1   p), and he (the buyer) gets zero surplus.
The deviation is protable for the seller because the cost of e¤ort is arbitrarily small. Therefore,
protable trade and no e¤ort at t = 1 is impossible in equilibrium. Second, suppose that no e¤ort
is expected in period 1 and that after no disclosure, the parties expect to continue to negotiate in
period 2 and then trade at a positive price with positive probability. By Proposition 1, this implies
q2  q1 > 1 p (e¤ort is expected in period 2). Suppose the seller exerts e¤ort in period 1 and does
exactly as she would do after exerting e¤ort in period 2 (discloses a positive signal if obtained, and
sells the good at the price she would charge in period 2). The sellers expected equilibrium prot
in period 2 is positive, which she receives in period 1 instead of period 2 by deviating in this way.
Hence the deviation is protable for the seller. We conclude that there is no equilibrium in which
the seller exerts no e¤ort in period 1 but then trades the good at a positive price with positive
probability in either period 1 or period 2.
Proof of Lemma 2. Direct calculations reveal that (1=2) =  (1  p)   1 < 0 and (1) = 0:
Moreover, when   1 and  2q; (q)  1 > 0; (q) = 0 for all q: This means that she is indi¤erent
between immediate trade and persuading, but the seller will then prefer to trade immediately if there
is even an innitesimal cost of acquiring new information. However, when  < 1 and q; (q) < 1=2
the payo¤-di¤erence becomes
(q) = 2q   1 +   q   p
which is strictly increasing in q: Then, there exists a unique threshold q  1 +p2  ; such that
(q) > 0 i¤ q > q: This is exactly the same threshold that determines q; (q) > 1=2. Note also that
q  q and q > 1=2:
Proof of Lemma 3. Step 1. Let us rst nd the threshold. From the discussion in the text we
know that the threshold must satisfy the following condition:
q+ (q
v
0) = q
but we know that q = (1 p)
2
p2+(1 p)2 ; so:
pqv0
pqv0 + (1  p) (1  qv0)
=
(1  p)2
p2 + (1  p)2
Solving for qv0 ; we get q
v
0 =
(1 p)3
[p2+(1 p)3] :
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Step 2. Now, we have to make sure that qv0 < q; which is equivalent to:
(1 p)3
[p2+(1 p)3] <
(1 p)2
p2+(1 p)2 ;which
is always true, given p 2   12 ; 1 :
Proof of Proposition 6. To show the existence of an interior solution, we can employ a continuity
argument. The rst-order condition is continuous in qs; and we know that if c = 0 the optimal
qs is 1. Hence, suppose to rise the cost of acquiring information by ", we can nd a qs  1 that
satises the principal optimal condition. For the rst point it su¢ ces to observe that if condition
(7) does not hold, the rst-order condition is negative for any value of qs: The condition  ! 0
derives directly from the inspection of q;b when  is close to one.
Proof of Proposition 7. The seller enters in the matching market if
s (p)  qmb
1  F (bqb)
F (bqb) 
Z qb
q
b
[d (qs) (2q
+
b   1)+ + (1  d (qs)) (2q;b   1)+]gdF (z)
where qmb is the mean buyers valuation. Notice that the left-hand side is constant with respect
to qs : then, the cuto¤ qhs is dened by the previous equation holding with equality. A necessary
condition to induce the seller to enter in this market is that the price she expects to charge p must
be greater than what she can get from the buyer with mean valuation. The comparative statics is
a direct application of the envelope theorem.
Proof of Proposition 9. First, note that the choice of the optimal p (vb) is not a¤ected by
the sellers prior belief. We can show that the value function in (12) has increasing di¤erences in
(vs; p) :
@ V (vs; vb)
@( p) =  
@cs
@s
@s
@( p)  0
and then we have that
@2 V (vs; vb)
@( p)@(vs)  0:
The rst inequality derives from the observation that increasing ( p) decreases the e¤ort choice s;
as it poses a limit to the sellers prot and that because the cost is increasing in the information
precision, the overall e¤ect is negative. The second inequality derives from the fact that increasing
the sellers prior belief increases again the optimal choice of e¤ort because the seller believes that
she will get a positive signal with higher probability, i.e., d+ increases; we can then conclude that
the value function V (vs; vb) presents increasing di¤erences in (vs; p): The optimizer p (vs) is thus
decreasing in vs. To show that the optimal p (vb) is increasing in vb; we can simply di¤erentiate
V (vs; vb) with respect to vb :
@ V (vs; vb)
@vb
= 1  [1  F (c)]
26664 @cs@s @

s
@vb| {z }
( )
+  +
@
@vb|{z}
( )
vb
37775  0
where the signs of the derivatives come from the observation that increasing the buyers assessment
of the good quality reduces his probability of getting a negative signal and thus induces a lower
e¤ort. The e¤ect on  follows immediately from its denition.
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